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Abstract 
Consider a group of individuals who must rank a set of decisions or choices. If the members 
of the group disagree, how should their opinions be reconciled into a group ordering? His- 
torically we may discern two ways of answering this question. The "relativist" approach, 
which is the dominant one in the modern social choice literature, holds that differences 
of opinion arise largely from differences in preferences or values. Hence the objective 
should be to  strike a fair compromise between differences of opinion. The "rationalist" 
approach, which was an article of faith among the eighteenth-century founders of voting 
theory, holds that differences of opinion arise from misperceptions about the true merit 
of different decisions. For them the goal was to find the ordering that is most likely to 
be "correct" or "true". These two positions are not incompatible. Under suitable con- 
ditions, in fact, they yield the same method, which was first proposed in a rudimentary 
form by Condorcet. We show that it can be characterized by a slight weakening of the 
independence of irrelevant alternative condition. 
Optimal Group Decisions 
Peyton Young 
Simvle maiority rule 
"Democracy," said E. B. White, "is the recurrent suspicion that more than half the people 
are right more than half the time" (White, 1946). The suspicion has been around for a 
long time. It is, in fact, the central thesis of a remarkable work published in 1785 by the 
French mathematician and political philosopher, Jean Antoine Nicholas Caritat, Marquis 
de Condorcet.] Condorcet set out to prove that majority rule is not only a fair way to 
make political choices, it is actually the best way to do so -- the way most likely to yield 
"optimal" results. Though this notion may at first sound strange to modern ears, it turns 
out to be a surprisingly fruitful way of thinking about the design of voting rules. 
Condorcet begins with the premise that the object of government is to make decisions 
that are in the best interest of society. This leads naturally to the question: what voting 
rules are most likely to yield good outcomes? To analyze this problem he applied the 
then-novel science of probability theory. Imagine that a group of voters must decide 
between two alternatives, one of which is objectively best. (Whether this is a meaningful 
assumption will be considered below.) Each individual makes a judgment about this 
question and registers his opinion. Sometimes, of course, people judge incorrectly. But 
let us assume -- perhaps too optimistically -- that each voter is more likely to make the 
right choice than the wrong choice in any given situation. Condorcet showed that, if the 
voters make their choices independently, then the laws of probability imply that the 
choice with the most votes is the one most likely to be correct. In other words, majority 
rule is an optimal method of group decision making. 
Consider the following example: there are one hundred individuals choosing between two 
alternatives a and b. Let the outcome be 55 votes for a and 45 votes for b. Assume that 
each of these individuals is right 60 percent of the time. Now there are two possibilities : 
either a is really the best choice or b is the best choice. In the first case the observed 
An Essay on the Application of Probability Theor). to Pluraliy Decisiorl Making, 1785. 
1 
voting pattern (55 for a, 45 for b) would occur with probability (loo! / 55! 45!) .655 ,445, 
while in the second case it would occur with probability (loo! / 45! 55!) .645 .455. As 
the former is about 58 times more probable than the latter, we conclude that a is more 
likely to be correct than b. This style of reasoning is known in statistics as maximum 
likelihood estimation. It is somewhat analogous to Bayesian inference with uniform 
priors, though formally it does not rely on the notion of priors at a11.2 
Why should we buy the idea, though, that there really is such a thing as a best choice? 
Aren't values relative, and isn't the point of voting to determine a compromise between 
conflicting opinions, all of which are equally entitled to a hearing? This relativistic point 
of view, which has reigned supreme in social choice theory (indeed in economic theory 
generally) for most of this century, seems completely at odds with Condorcet's basic 
premises. Yet Condorcet's point of view is not nearly as absurd as it might seem at first 
blush. Consider a trial by jury. Let a be the proposition that the defendant is guilty, b 
that she is innocent. If all twelve members of the jury vote for conviction, and if the 
probability that each is correct is 0.60, then the probability that the defendant is in fact 
innocent is less than one in fifty thousand (assuming equal prior probability of guilt or 
innocence). 
This "unanimity rule" is called for if a false conviction is deemed much worse than letting 
a guilty party go free. But if the objective is simply to reach the correct decision with 
highest probability, then clearly this is not the best one can do. The probability of 
making the correct choice under unanimity rule is only slightly greater than one-half 
(about S o l ) .  But under simple majority rule the probability of a correct choice is about 
.665. More generally, it can be shown that, among all group decision rules on two 
alternatives, simple majority rule is most likely to yield the correct outcome.3 
Furthermore, as the size of group becomes larger, the probability that the majority 
decision is correct approaches unity -- a result first proved by Condorcet.4 
A Bayesian analysis of the situation would proceed as follows. Suppose that a and b are equally likely to 
be best a priori. Let p be the conditional probability that the vote would occur given that a is best, and let q 
be the conditional probability that it would occur given that b is best. Then the posterior probability that a 
is best is p/(p + q) = .983, while the posterior probability that b is best is q/(p + q)  = .017. Thus we would 
choose a rather than b. 
For this result we assume that the number of voters is odd, that each makes his judgment independently, 
and that each chooses correctly with probability p, where 112 < p < 1. See Nitzan and Paroush (1982) and 
Shapley and Grofman (1984). 
For related work see Poisson (1837). Urken and Traflet (1974), Grofman, Owen, and Feld (1983). and 
Grofman and Feld (1988). 
This result reaches far beyond jury trials. It applies, in fact, to any choice problem in 
which people agree about the objective, but there is disagreement about the best means to 
achieve that objective. For example, the members of the Federal Reserve Board may all 
want to maximize the long-run rate of economic growth, but at any given moment they 
may be uncertain whether lowering or raising interest rates is the best way to achieve this. 
Similarly, the directors of a corporation may agree that their task is to maximize the 
firm's long-run profitability, but they may have different views about which candidate for 
chief executive is most likely to realize this goal. In these situations Condorcet's 
premises make perfect sense, and simple majority rule is the best way to estimate the 
optimal choice. Moreover, this is how such decisions are usually made in practice. 
Weighted majority rule 
Suppose, however, that some voters are known to have better judgment than others. 
Should we still give all votes equal weight, or should we perhaps ignore all voters except 
those whose judgment has proven to be best in the past? In fact neither answer is 
correct. To see why, consider a situation in which the five members of a central bank are 
voting whether to raise interest rates. Assume that each member votes to raise rates if 
and only if she believes that not increasing rates will cause inflation to exceed the target 
set by the bank. Assume further that the track record of each member of the committee 
-- how often she has been right about the effect of interest rates on inflation -- is known 
from past experience. Perhaps A and B have been right 90 percent of the time, while C, 
D, and E have been right only 60 percent of the time. If we give all votes equal weight, 
we ignore the fact that A's and B's opinions convey more accurate information than the 
others. But if we set aside all opinions except those of A and B, we are losing 
information from the others that is accurate on the whole. There is value in having more 
rather than fewer independent judgments. Thus it stands to reason that the opinions of A 
and B should be given more weight than the others, but not all the weight. It turns out 
that the optimal decision rule is to use a weighted majority, where the weight on each 
member's vote is log (pi/(l - pi)) and 112 < pi < 1 is the probability that individual i makes 
correct judgments (Nitzan and Paroush, 1982; Shapley and Grofman, 1984). In the 
present case this means that each of A and B should have about 5.4 times the number of 
votes that each of D, E, and F has. This amounts to saying that a "majority" is a group 
that contains both A 2nd B, or A plus at least two of the weak members, or B plus at least 
two of the weak members. 
Extension to three or more alternatives 
When we try to extend this reasoning to three or more alternatives, however, matters 
become more complicated. For, as Condorcet was the first to show, there is no direct 
analog of simple majority rule in this case. The difficulty is that there are situations in 
which no alternative obtains a simple majority over every other. Consider the following 
example from Condorcet's Essay involving three alternatives and sixty voters. Here 
majority rule comes up empty-handed because it leads to a voting cycle: a beats b by 33 
to 27, b beats c by 42 to 18, and c beats a by 35 to 25. 
Example 1 
The problem that Condorcet set himself was to determine the voting rule that is optimal 
under these circumstances. To make the example concrete, let us suppose that a stands 
for the policy "hire more police," b stands for the policy "increase prison sentences," and 
c is the policy "offer training programs for ex-convicts." Each of these policies aims at 
reducing crime, and we shall suppose that the voters are trying to judge which will be the 
most effective, i.e., which will reduce the crime rate most per dollar spent. In other 
words, there really is a correct ranking of the policies, but there are differences of opinion 
about what that ranking might be. 
Assume that, given any two of the policies to compare, each voter has a fixed probability 
p > 112 of choosing the right one (i.e., the most effective one). Assume further that each 
voter's judgment about any pair is independent of the other voters' judgments, and that his 
judgment about a given pair is independent of his judgment about the other pairs. (One 
can quibble with the realism of these assumptions but they merely serve to simplify the 
calculations.) 
For each possible ranking of the alternatives, we want to compute the conditional 
probability that the above voting pattern would occur given that the ranking is correct. 
Suppose, for instance, that the correct ranking is a b c. Now the probability of the above 
vote is the product of three terms: the probability that a gets 33 votes over b, the 
probability that b gets 42 votes over c, and the probability that a gets 25 votes over c. 
Hence the probability of the vote in Example 1 is proportional to p33(1 - P)27 x 
p42(1 - p)18 x p25(1 - p)35 = plo0 (1 - P)~O. In general, the larger the exponent of p, the 
higher the likelihood that the given ranking is the correct one. Thus we will have solved 
the problem once we compute the exponent of p for each of the six possible rankings. 
A convenient way to visualize the problem to draw a vote graph like that shown in 
Figure 1. 
a 
Figure 1. 
There is one vertex for each alternative, and between every pair of vertices there are two 
edges, one in each direction. The weight on an edge is the number of votes that the 
alternative at its base gets over the alternative at its tip. To evaluate the probability of a 
ranking such as a b c, consider the three pairwise propositions: a is above b, b is above c, 
and a is above c. These correspond to the three directed edges a -t b, b + c, and 
a + c, which have weights 33, 42, and 25 respectively. Thus the total support for the 
ranking a b c is 33 + 42 + 25 = 100. The support for the other rankings is found in like 
fashion. Namely, each ranking corresponds to a set of three directed edges that do not 
form a cycle, and the corresponding exponent on p equals the total weight on these edges. 
The results are given below, and they show that b c a is most likely to be correct in this 
case. 
a b c  100 b c a  104 
a c b  76 c a b  86 
b a c  94 c b a  80 
In general, whenever there is a voting cycle among three alternatives, the maximum 
likelihood ranking is obtained by breaking the cycle at its weakest link, that is, by 
deleting the edge in the cycle that has the smallest majority. (In the above example, the 
cycle a -+ b + c 4 a would be broken at the link a t b.) When there is no voting cycle, 
the maximum likelihood ranking is the one that accords with simple majority rule on all 
pairs of alternatives. This identifies the maximum likelihood ranking when there are 
exactly three alternatives, and is known as Condorcet's rule of three. 
The case of more than three alternatives 
Unfortunately, when there are more than three alternatives, Condorcet seems to have 
become confused; at any rate he did not get the correct answer.5 Nevertheless the 
solution can be found by a straightforward extension of the previous argument. Given a 
voting outcome and a ranhng R of the alternatives, the conditional probability of 
observing the vote, given that the true ranhng is R, is proportional to ps(R) (1 - p)M - s(R) 
where M = nm(m - 1)/2 and s(R) is the total number of pairwise votes that higher 
alternatives get over lower alternatives in R. We shall call s(R) the support for the 
ranking R. The maximum likelihood rankings are precisely the ones with maximum 
support. To compute them, it suffices to find the maximum weight set of edges in the 
vote graph that does not contain a cycle. This maximum likelihood rule is the solution to 
Condorcet's p r ~ b l e m . ~  
Borda's rule 
At this point we need to pick up a second strand in our story that actually begins 
somewhat earlier. In 1770, some fifteen years before Condorcet published his work on 
voting theory, his colleague Jean-Charles de Borda read a paper on the design of voting 
procedures to the French Academy of Sciences. Like Condorcet, Borda was a prominent 
figure in scientific circles with interests that spanned a wide variety of subjects. Unlike 
For a discussion of Condorcet's somewhat obscure argument in this case, see Young (1988) and Crepe1 
( 1 990). 
Young (1986, 1988). The maximum likelihood rule can be formulated as an integer programming 
problem. Define a variable xi, for each directed edge i 3 j  i n  the vote graph, that is, one variable for each 
ordered pair of alternatives. Let Wij be the weight on edge i +j, that is, the number of votes for alternative 
i over alternative j. A maximum likelihood ranking corresponds to a solution x that maximizes~wijxij 
subject to xij + Xji = 1, Xij + Xjk + xki i. 2, and all xi, = 0 or 1. If the voters have different competences, 
individual i's vote IS weighted by log (piI(l-pi), where pi is the probability that i is correct and 112 < pi < I .  
Condorcet, he had a strong practical bent. In addition to doing important research in 
mechanics, hydraulics, and optics, he was one of the leading lights in developing the 
metric system. This put him in the applied faction of the Academy, which was often at 
loggerheads with purists like Condorcet. This rivalry seems to have spilled over into 
their work on voting theory, as we shall see later on. 
Borda began by observing that, when there are three or more alternatives, the one that 
achieves the most first-place votes is not necessarily the one that has the most overall 
support. As an example, consider the following situation. There are three alternatives 
and twenty-one voters who rank them as follows: 
7 7 6 1  
b a c  a 
c c b b 
a b a c  
Example 2 
Under the conventional plurality method, a gets 8 votes, b 7, and c 6. But this fails to 
take into account that all but one of the people who prefer a like c better than b, and 
everyone who prefers b likes c better than a. One could therefore argue that c is the most 
natural compromise candidate even though it receives the fewest first-place votes. To 
assess the true strength of the various candidates, said Borda, one must look at their 
overall standing in the individual rankings. This led him to propose the following rule. 
Let each voter strictly rank-order the candidates. (For simplicity of exposition we assume 
no indifference.) In each voter's list, assign a score of 0 to the alternative ranked last, a 
score of 1 to the alternative ranked next-to-last, a score of 2 to the alternative next above 
that, and so forth. The Borda score of an alternative is its total score summed over all 
voter lists, and Borda's rule is to rank the alternatives from highest to lowest Borda score. 
In the above example the scores are 26 for c, 21 for b, and 16 for a. Thus, according to 
Borda's rule, the proper ordering of the alternatives is c b a, which is exactly the opposite 
of the one implied by the number of first-place votes. 
Although it may not be obvious at first, Borda's rule (like Condorcet's) actually depends 
only on the painvise votes between the various alternatives. The simplest way to see this 
is to observe that the Borda score of an alternative within a particular voter's list is just 
the number of alternatives ranked below it. It follows that the total Borda score of an 
alternative x is the total number of times that x beats other alternatives, summed over all 
of the voter lists. 
A convenient way of computing the Borda solution is to construct a matrix indicating the 
pairwise votes. For each ordered pair of alternatives a, b, let vat, denote the total number 
of times that a is ranked above b in the voter lists. In other words, vat, is the number of 
votes that a would get over b in a pairwise contest between the two, assuming that 
everyone votes according to his preferences. (This is the weight on the edge directed 
from a to b in the vote graph.) The m x m matrix (vat,) is called the vote matrix. It 
follows from the above discussion that the Borda score of each alternative x is just the 
sum of the entries in x's row. In terms of the vote graph, it is the sum of the weights on 
all edges directed away from the vertex corresponding to x. The vote matrix for 
Example 2 is shown below, together with the row sums. 
a b  c Row sum 
a -- 8 8 16 
b 13 -- 8 2 1 
c 13 13 -- 26 
Condorcet's critiaue of Borda: independence of irrelevant alternatives 
Borda's paper was not published until 1784, one year before Condorcet's treatise on 
voting appeared. Condorcet took strong exception to Borda's method on the merits; 
moreover he added a certain amount of personal venom to the attack. (Throughout the 
Essay Condorcet refers sarcastically to the "method of a famous mathematician" but fails 
to mention him by name. The implication is that the method is not worthy of a 
mathematician.) 
Condorcet's contemptuous view of Borda is borne out in  his private correspondence. For example, in  a 
letter to Turgot he wrote: "[M. Malesherbes] makes a great case for Borda, not because of his memoirs, 
some of which suggest talent (although nothing will ever come of them, and no one has ever spoken of 
them or ever will) but because he is what one calls a good academician, that is to say, because he speaks in 
meetings of the Academy and asks for nothing better than to waste his time doing prospectuses, examining 
machines, etc., and above all because, feeling eclipsed by other mathematicians, he, like d'Arcy, has 
abandoned mathematics for petty physics." (Henry, 1883)- 
To illustrate his objections to Borda's method, Condorcet introduced the following 
example. There are three candidates named Peter, Paul, and Jack, and eighty-one voters 
with the following preferences: 
30 1 29 10 10 1 
Peter Peter Paul Paul Jack Jack 
Paul Jack Peter Jack Peter Paul 
Jack Paul Jack Peter Paul Peter 
According to Borda's rule the proper ordering is Paul, Peter, Jack. But this is absurd, 
said Condorcet, because Peter obtains a simple majority over both Paul and Jack. Surely 
this means that Peter is stronger than Paul. More generally, Condorcet formulated the 
majority principle, which states that if there exists an alternative that obtains a simple 
majority over every other alternative, then it should be rankedfirst. Such an alternative is 
known as a Condorcet alternative or a majority alternative. Condorcet went on to 
examine why Borda's rule gives the "wrong" result in this case. 
"[Hlow is it that Paul is not the clear winner when the only difference 
between himself and Peter is that Peter got 31 first places and 39 second, 
while Paul got 39 first and 31 second? Well, out of the 39 voters who put 
Peter second, 10 preferred him to Paul, whereas only one of the 3 1 voters 
who put Paul second preferred him to Peter. The points method [of Borda] 
confuses votes comparing Peter and Paul with those comparing either 
Peter or Paul to Jack and uses them to judge the relative merits of Peter 
and Paul. As long as it relies on irrelevant factors to form its judgments, it 
is bound to lead to error, and that is the real reason why this method is 
defective for a great many voting patterns, regardless of the particular 
values assigned to each place. The conventional method [plurality] is 
flawed because it ignores elements which should be taken into account and 
the new one [Borda's] because it takes into account elements which should 
be ignored" (italics added). 
This passage is from a later paper of Condorcet's entitled "On the Constitution and the Functions of 
Provincial Assemblies" (Condorcet, 1788). The translation is by Sommerlad and McLean (1989), who 
were the first to call attention to its connection with independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
In other words, Condorcet is saying that the comparison between Peter and Paul should 
depend only on the relative ordering of these two candidates in the voters' lists, not on 
their relation to other candidates. Here is a clear forerunner of Arrow's principle of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives! 
Condorcet noted the remarkable fact that any scoring system leads to the same outcome 
as Borda's rule in this example, and is therefore subject to the same criticism. In general, 
a scoring method is defined by a sequence of real numbers sl > s2 > . . . > s,, one for 
each alternative. Given an individual's ranking of the alternatives, assign a score of sl to 
the alternative that occupies first position, a score of s2 to the alternative in second 
position, and so forth. The total score of each alternative is the sum of its scores over all 
voter lists, and the alternatives are ordered according to their total scores. Borda's rule 
corresponds to the scoring system Si = m - i; in fact, it is equivalent to any scoring system 
in which the successive differences Si - Si+l are equal and positive. 
Consider now any scoring system for three alternatives with descending scores sl > s2 > 
s3. In example 3, the score for Peter is 31sl + 39s2 + 1 Is3 whereas the score for Paul is 
39sl + 31s2 + 1 ls3. Therefore, Paul obtains a higher score than Peter, even though Peter 
is the majority candidate. From this we conclude that any scoring system violates the 
majority principle. Moreover, it shows that any scoring system yields outcomes that are 
based on "irrelevant factors." 
Local inde~endence of irrelevant alternatives 
Condorcet's broadside against Borda is fine as far as it goes. But exactly how far does it 
go? We know from Arrow's theorem that independence of irrelevant alternatives is 
violated by every reasonable decision rule when there are more than two alternatives. 
Why then should we believe that Condorcet's approach is any better than Borda's? In this 
section we shall show that it is, in fact, considerably better. 
To motivate the discussion, let us first consider why a condition like independence of 
irrelevant alternatives is worth having at all. Essentially it says that the way a given 
group of alternatives is ordered should depend only on opinions about those alternatives9 
There are at least two reasons why this is desirable from a practical standpoint. First, if it 
I neglect various fine distinctions in the way that one formulates the independence condition. 
10 
does not hold, then it is possible to manipulate the outcome by introducing extraneous 
alternatives (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). Second, independence allows the 
electorate to make sensible decisions within a restricted range of choices without 
worrying about the universe of all possible choices. It is desirable to know, for example, 
that the relative ranking of candidates for political office would not be changed if purely 
hypothetical candidates were included on the ballot. 
While Arrow's theorem shows that independence cannot be fully realized by any 
democratic rule, we shall show that it can be realized to a significant extent. Consider 
Example 3 again. The real contest here is between Peter and Paul; Jack is a distinctly 
weaker alternative. We could argue that Jack ought to be "irrelevant" to the choice 
between Peter and Paul because Jack is inferior to both. Moreover, under Condorcet's 
rule of three, this is actually the case. 
The key point here is that Peter and Paul occur together in the consensus ranking; they 
are not separated by other alternatives. More generally, an interval of an ordering is any 
subset of alternatives that occurs in succession in that ordering. Suppose we insist that, 
whenever a set of alternatives forms an interval of the consensus preference ordering, 
then independence of irrelevant alternatives applies -- that is, the ordering within the 
interval remains fixed when alternatives outside the interval are ignored. In particular, 
the ordering of alternatives toward the top of the list is unaffected by the removal of those 
at the bottom. Similarly, the ranlung of the alternatives toward the bottom of the list is 
unaffected by the removal of those at the top, and so forth. We shall say that such a 
ranking rule satisfies local independence of irrelevant alternatives (LIIA). It is a 
remarkable fact that the maximum likelihood method satisfies LIIA.10 Moreover, as we 
shall argue in a later section, it is the only reasonable ranking rule that does so. 
To further illustrate this idea, consider the following vote matrix involving six 
alternatives and one hundred voters. 
See Young (1988), where the LIIA condition was called local s tabi l i~.  
11 
a b c d e f Sum 
- - - -  - - - - - - - - - _ _  
a 1 -- 
I 5 1 54 1 58 60 6 2 285 
Example 4 
Here we may think of a, b, and c as being the real choices under discussion, while d, e, 
and f are red herrings that have been dragged in by political strategists to attempt to 
manipulate the outcome. (Note that each of a, b, c has a majority over each of d, e, f, so 
the latter three are weaker than the former.) Moreover, this attempt will succeed if 
Borda's rule is used. The row sums determine the Borda ordering c a b d e f. Now 
suppose that the three red herrings had not been introduced into the debate. Then the 
vote matrix would be the one enclosed by the dashed lines. The Borda scores for this 
three-alternative situation are 105 for a, 117 for b, and 78 for c. Hence, in the absence of 
d, e, f, that top three alternatives would be ordered b a c. But this is exactly the reverse 
of how they are ordered when all six alternatives are considered together. This example 
shows why Borda's rule is highly susceptible to manipulative practices, just as Condorcet 
alleged. 
Now consider the maximum likelihood (ML) solution to this problem. We begin by 
observing an important property of this rule: if some alternative has a simple majority 
over every other, then the M L  rule must rank itfirst. The reason is simple. Suppose that 
x (the majority alternative) were not ranked first. Then it must be ranked immediately 
below some other alternative y. By assumption, x defeats y by a simple majority. 
Therefore, if we switch the positions of x and y, we obtain a new ranking that is 
supported by more pairwise votes. But then the new ranking is more likely than the 
original ranking, which is a contradiction. 
This simple fact can be used to deduce the ML solution to the above problem almost 
immediately. Since a is the majority alternative, it must be ranked first. Among the 
remaining alternatives, b obtains a simple majority over c, d, e, and f. Hence a similar 
argument shows that b comes next. Then comes c by the same argument. As for d, e, 
and f, they will be ordered relative to one another as if they were tlte only three 
alternatives. (Since they form an interval of the consensus ordering, LIIA applies). It is 
easy to see that the ML solution for these three alternatives is d f e. Putting all of this 
together, we conclude that the ML solution to the whole problem is a b c d f e. This 
example shows that the ML solution is often quite easy to calculate even when there is 
more than a handful of alternatives. 
At this point we can also see more clearly why the method satisfies LIIA, that is, why any 
interval of alternatives is ranked as it would be in the absence of the otl~ers. The reason 
is this: if it were not, then one could shuffle the alternatives witlzin tlze interval and obtain 
an ordering that is supported by a larger number of pairwise votes, hence an ordering that 
has greater likelihood. This contradiction shows that the maximum likelihood rule 
satisfies local independence of irrelevant alternatives. In particular, it cannot be 
manipulated from below by introducing inferior alternatives, nor can it be manipulated 
from above by introducing utopian (i.e., attractive but infeasible) alternatives. 
The maximum likelihood method as a form of compromise 
So far we have proceeded on the premise that there really is a best ordering to be 
estimated. Moreover we have argued that this is often the right way to think about group 
choice problems. But it is not always the right way to think about them. There are 
many situations in which differences of opinion do not arise from erroneous judgments, 
but from differences in values. In this case it seems better to adopt the view that group 
choice is an exercise in defining consensus, that is, in finding a compromise between 
conflicting opinions. Arrow's axiomatic approach is one way of analyzing this issue, and 
we shall pick up this scent again in the next section. First, however, I want to draw 
attention to another interesting approach along these lines that was pioneered by John 
Kemeny (1 959). 
Kemeny viewed the voters' opinions as data, and asked for the ordering that best 
represents or averages the data. For the notion of average to make sense, of course, we 
must have some way of measuring how far apart one ranking is from another, that is, we 
need a metric defined on the set of rankings. Kemeny proposed the following natural 
metric: the distance between two rankings R and R' is the number of puirs of alternatives 
on which they difler. Thus if R' is obtained from R by interchanging two adjacent 
alternatives, then d(R, R') = 1. If R' is obtained from R by reversing the order of all 
alternatives, then d(R, R') = m(m - 1)/2, and so forth.] 
Suppose now that each member of a group of n voters submits a ranking of the 
alternatives. Given these n data points, what is the best definition of a compromise 
ordering? A statistician would say there are two obvious answers: the mean and the 
median. The mean is the ranking (or rankings) that minimize the sum of squares of 
distances from the n given rankings. The median is the ranking (or rankings) that 
minimize the sum of distances from the n given rankings. It is not difficult to show that 
the median is equivalent to the maximum likelihood method, whereas the mean yields a 
quite different scheme. 
Kemeny left open the question of whether the mean or the median was to be preferred. 
There can be little doubt, however, that the median is the better choice under the 
circumstances. To see why, consider the following example with 41 voters and three 
alternatives. 
21 5 4 11 
a b c c 
b c a b  
c a b a  
Example 4 
Alternative a has an absolute majority of first-place votes, so afortiori it is the majority 
alternative. Indeed, the ranking a b c is supported by a majority, so it has maximum 
likelihood, that is, it is the median ranking. (It may be checked that Borda's rule yields 
the same result.) A simple calculation shows, however, that the mean ranking is b a c. 
This seems to be a less credible conception of consensus than does a b c. The problem 
with the mean is that it places a lot of weight on extreme observations. In the present 
case, the voters who announce the ordering c b a shift the outcome in favor of b, not 
because they are especially attached to b, but because their top candidate is c, which is at 
Actually, Kemeny defined the distance between two rankings to be twice the number of pairs on which 
they differ. He also defined the distance between ordering with indifference. For simplicity of exposition 
we ignore this case. 
odds with the views of most of the other voters. In other words, their opinion about b 
versus a is heavily weighted because their opinions about something else (namely c) 
differs from the opinion of the majority. This does not seem very sensible. We conclude 
that, if the object is to find a compromise between the various rankings reported by the 
voters, then the median is, in a statistical sense, the most appropriate solution. This 
reinforces the argument for the maximum likelihood rule, but from a different (and more 
modem) point of view. 
An axiomatic iustification 
Pursuing this point of view a bit further, one might wonder whether the ML rule can be 
justified from purely axiomatic principles. We shall show that it can. Indeed, it is the 
unique ranking rule that satisfies three standard axioms in the social choice literature plus 
local independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
Define a ranking rule to be a function that associates one or more consensus ranlungs 
with every set of rankings reported by a group of individuals on a finite set of 
alternatives. The rule is anonymous if it treats all voters alike. It is neutral if it treats all 
alternatives alike. It is Pareto if, whenever everyone ranks one alternative above another, 
then so does the consensus ranking. Finally, a rule satisfies reinforcement if, whenever 
two distinct groups of voters reach the same consensus ordering under separate votes, this 
ordering is also the consensus for the two groups merged together. For example, if the 
House of Representatives orders three choices a b c, and the Senate also orders these 
choices a b c (using the same voting rule), then a b c is the outcome when the rule is 
applied to both houses together and the votes remain as before.12 (In practice almost all 
rules have this property.) It may then be shown that the maximum likelihood rule is the 
unique ranking rule that is anonymous, neutral, Pareto, satisfies reinforcement, and local 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
l 2  This idea was introduced by Young and Levenglick (1978). In the case of ties, reinforcement states that 
the rankings chosen by both groups separately (if any such exist) are precisely the rankings that result when 
the votes of the two groups are pooled. A variation of the concept characterizes scoring methods (Smith, 
1973; Young. 1974, 1975). 
l 3  This follows from Young and Levenglick (1978), Theorem 3. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that the maximum likelihood method for ranking alternatives can be 
justified from several different points of view. On the one hand it is arguably the best 
method if we think of voting as a collective quest for truth, that is, as a way of estimating 
what decisions are most likely to be "correct" or most likely to meet a given objective. 
This is quite a common situation, especially when the decision is being taken by a group 
of experts. But it also applies to many forms of political decision making -- what bill is 
most likely to reduce crime, what foreign policy will minimize the prospect of war, and 
so forth. 
On the other hand, there are surely situations where i t  is more natural to think of voting as 
a way of compromising between conflicting values. Here again the ML rule makes 
sense, because it represents the median opinion. Alternatively, one might want a method 
that is resistant to strategic manipulation. As we know from the Gibbard- Satterthwaite 
theorem, almost no method has this property, which is intimately connected with 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is possible, however, to design ranking rules 
that are immune to manipulation from above by utopian alternatives, and from below by 
inferior alternatives. Moreover, the ML rule is the only rule that satisfies this local 
independence of irrelevant alternatives property plus other standard conditions. 
The one remaining question is whether the maximum likelihood method is really 
practical. Compared with more traditional methods like plurality voting, single 
transferable vote, or even Borda's rule, it is more complicated to calculate. It even seems 
to have eluded Condorcet's considerable computational skills. Given our present 
understanding of the problem and modem computing capabilities, however, the issue is 
largely moot. To find the maximum likelihood solution for six or fewer alternatives, for 
example, is a near triviality. Even for much larger numbers of alternatives, the method 
can be implemented in about the same amount of time that it takes people to cast their 
votes. The more important issue is whether the method is intuitively easy to grasp, and 
whether it improves on methods currently in use. On both of these counts I think that the 
answer is affirmative, and I predict that the time will come when it is considered a 
standard tool for political and group decision making. 
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